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The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do 
You Trust? 
 
ABSTRACT 
Tax compliance is an important issue for governments and the public alike. To meet 
public needs and fund public mandates, firms around the world are expected to comply with tax 
laws. Factors that are related to organizational (firm) tax compliance have not been sufficiently 
examined in the literature. Due to the increasing global influence of transition economies, factors 
associated with firm tax compliance in transition economies are particularly of interest. Based on 
a sample of over 5,000 firms from 22 former Soviet Bloc transition economies, we find that 
higher levels of corruption and higher levels of particularized trust (reliance on friends and 
family) are associated with lower levels of tax compliance. Interestingly, we also find that the 
negative relationship between corruption and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher 
generalized trust (trust in strangers). Overall, our study’s results suggest that institutional factors 
play an important role and are related to firm tax compliance behavior in transition economies.  
 
Cite as: Alon A. and Hageman A. 2013. Impact of Corruption on Organizational Tax 
Compliance in Transition Economies. Journal of Business Ethics. Forthcoming. 
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The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do 
You Trust? 
INTRODUCTION 
Tax compliance is an important issue for nations around the world as governments search 
for revenue to meet public needs (Andreoni et al., 1998). Firms around the world are expected to 
behave ethically and comply with tax laws. However, the ethics of tax compliance is a complex 
issue as noted in the essay by Kavka (1983). In his example, firms are expected to act ethically 
but may be justified in underreporting revenue if the taxation system is corrupt. “Under these 
circumstances, any company that reported its true profits would not be believed and would end 
up having to pay more than its fair share of taxes” (Kavka, 1983, p. 63). Robertson et al. (2002) 
noted that ethical responses depend on the situational context. Countries with different 
institutional influences may have alternative views of what is ethical as it relates to tax 
compliance.  
With transition economies1 playing an increasingly important role in the global economy 
and politics, organizational (firm) tax compliance is particularly of interest. Currently, there is a 
lack of theoretical explanation and empirical evidence about tax behavior in transition economies 
(Torgler, 2005). This lack of research is of particular concern given an increasingly important 
role of transition economies. 
The majority of prior tax compliance studies have examined individual behavior 
(Andreoni et al. 1998). Tax compliance by firms is an important but understudied issue (Torgler, 
2008; Bayer and Cowell, 2009). Specifically, firm behavior is not analogous to individual 
behavior due to both the internal structure of corporations (in which multiple parties are involved 
                                                 
1
 Transition economies are developing countries that are transitioning from centrally-planned to market-based 
economies, such as former Soviet Bloc countries (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, etc.).  
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in decision making) and the potential influence of other firms (particularly in industries 
dominated by a small number of firms; Bayer and Cowell, 2009). Anderoni et al. (1998, p. 856) 
wrote, “there is a need for more empirical and institutional research within jurisdictions outside 
of the U.S. Available evidence suggests that noncompliance is particularly acute in many 
developing countries, making them especially fertile areas for future research efforts.” Thus, the 
purpose of this study is to evaluate the relationship between institutional factors and 
organizational tax compliance in transition economies.  
Transition economies are frequently associated with high levels of corruption 
(Kaufmann, 2009). Corruption is defined as the abuse of power for private gain (e.g., Aguilera 
and Vadera, 2008). Numerous studies have documented the negative impact of corruption on 
economic development (e.g., Campos et al., 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993; Mauro, 1995). Corruption is also deemed negatively associated with tax compliance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). However, according to Ashforth et al. (2008), there is a need to 
provide a deeper understanding of the construct of corruption. This study draws upon economic 
and institutional perspectives to investigate the relationship between corruption and tax 
compliance in transition economies.  
The endemic corruption that is frequently observed in transition economies is 
conceptualized as an institutional factor (Teorell, 2007) that is expected to negatively impact 
firm tax compliance. The impact of corruption on economic variables differs among countries. 
Despite high levels of corruption, some nations still demonstrate high growth and attract 
significant foreign investment (Li, 2009). Closer examination revealed that the levels and type of 
social trust play a role in the degree of influence of corruption. High levels of trust among 
societal members reduce the negative impact of corruption on economic growth (Li and Wu, 
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2007; Li, 2009). However, prior studies that have examined the role of trust in transition 
economies have failed to differentiate between generalized trust (trust in strangers) and 
particularized trust (reliance on friends and family). We draw on work by Li (2009) for the 
distinction between particularized trust and generalized trust and examine how these factors are 
related to firm tax compliance. We also examine the potential interactive role of corruption and 
trust.  
We test our proposed model based on a comprehensive dataset containing responses from 
executives at over 5,000 firms in 22 transition economies of the former Soviet Bloc. The findings 
indicate that higher levels of corruption (in the form of unofficial payments) and higher levels of 
particularized trust are each associated with lower levels of tax compliance. We also find that the 
negative relationship between tax compliance and corruption is weakened in situations of higher 
generalized trust. These findings suggest that the established trust patterns of firm managers 
within organizations have a strong relationship with tax compliance behavior. 
The study contributes to the literature in several important ways. It integrates two 
separate, but under-researched areas in the tax compliance field: tax compliance by firms and tax 
compliance in transition countries. Theoretically, our study integrates both economic and 
institutional perspectives to allow for a deeper understanding of organizational tax compliance 
behavior. The economic perspective recognizes the negative impact of corruption on tax 
compliance. The institutional view provides insight on how established institutional factors, such 
as trust, are related to tax compliance, particularly in the presence of corruption. As social 
networks frequently drive business transactions in transition economies, the differentiation 
between generalized and particularized trust allows for an exploration of how established 
approaches to doing business relate to tax compliance behavior.  
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Empirically, the study provides much needed evidence about factors influencing 
organizational tax compliance in transition economies, and contributes to the oft-neglected field 
of firm tax behavior (e.g., Torgler, 2008). The results contribute to the literature by highlighting 
the importance of social trust in firm-level behavior. Furthermore, the findings suggest the 
difficulty of increasing organizational tax compliance in relation-based environments that rely on 
close family and friends (particularized trust). Finally, in an increasingly global world, 
understanding tax compliance in transition economies is also important to businesses in 
developed economies. The degree of institutional distance between a host and home country 
increases the difficulties of conducting business in a foreign country (Xu and Shenkar, 2002), 
and understanding the differences in institutional environments is essential to effectively 
working across institutional differences (Gelbuda et al. 2008).   
The study proceeds as follows. The following section presents a review of the literature 
and develops hypotheses investigating organizational tax compliance, corruption, and social trust 
systems. The subsequent sections discuss the study’s research method and results. The final 
section provides a summary and conclusions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Tax Compliance  
To date, most tax compliance studies have focused on individual behavior (Andreoni et 
al. 1998). The few studies on organizational (firm) income tax evasion have typically focused on 
economic influences of compliance behavior, such as the penalty structure and other means of 
enforcement (e.g., Crocker and Slemod, 2005; Chen and Chu, 2005; Bayer and Cowell, 2009). 
While research on tax compliance by firms has begun to develop a richer picture of the influence 
of economic factors, more research is needed on the role of cultural and institutional factors. 
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Indeed, across the world, the actual rate of tax compliance by individuals and businesses alike is 
vastly higher than what would be predicted under pure economic models of enforcement (e.g., 
Andreoni et al., 1998; Posner, 2000). At the individual level, social norms explain much of the 
variation in cross-country tax compliance rates (Bobek et al., 2007). This suggests that broader 
cultural and institutional factors may influence tax compliance at the firm level as well.   
Another important and understudied area concerns tax compliance in transition 
economies (Anderoni et al., 1998). Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2000, p. 287) argue that tax 
administration has been a significant problem in the transition from centrally-planned to a 
market-based system, leading to significantly high rates of tax evasion, as “compliance rates of 
50 percent or lower are not uncommon” in some nations. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab blame 
the lack of attention placed on tax administration and enforcement for these rates, but also argue 
that “taxpayers’ culture” plays a significant role (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2000, p. 293). 
More recent data also suggests that the unofficial payments to tax officials in transition countries 
are a serious problem that reduces overall tax compliance rates (Joulfaian, 2009). Similarly, 
Uslaner (2010) finds that tax evasion is more likely in transition countries when the perceived 
quality of governmental services is low and the level of corruption is high. While Uslaner’s 
(2010) analysis did not include a direct measure for “trust in the government,” he argued that 
poor service quality likely translated into reduced governmental trust, which in turn reduced 
incentives to comply with tax laws. Thus, cultural and institutional factors may play an 
important role in tax compliance decisions. Two factors we discuss next are corruption and 
social trust. 
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Corruption in Transition Economies 
According to the Corruption and the Private Sector report by the Transparency 
International, unofficial payments received by officials in developing economies are believed to 
total as much as $40 billion annually (Transparency International, 2009). The construct of 
corruption is commonly defined as abuse of public power for private gain (e.g., Lapalombara, 
1994; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Aguilera and Vadera, 2008). Corruption thrives in countries 
where administrative apparatuses have excessive power and law enforcement lacks transparency 
(Braguinsky, 1996; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). In many transition economies, corruption is 
endemic (Kaufmann, 1997). 
Corruption is often studied from an economic perspective. From that lens, weak 
governments tend to have higher levels of corruption due to the lack of control over agencies 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Some scholars view corruption as efficiency-enhancing where it is a 
needed “grease” for transactions that otherwise would be less efficient (Braguinsky, 1996; Leff, 
1964). On the other hand, numerous studies have demonstrated that corruption hinders 
investment and economic growth (e.g., Campos et al., 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995). High levels of corruption increase investment risk and the cost of 
doing business in a country (Robertson and Watson, 2004). Empirically, studies analyzing 
developing countries have found that corruption impedes economic development (Ampratwum, 
2008; de la Croix and Delavallade, 2009). In a study of 54 developing countries, greater 
corruption was also related to lower government efficiency (Ahmad and Brookins, 2007). The 
expectation that developing countries can control corruption with increased industrialization has 
been challenged due to the differences in the level of corruption among countries with the similar 
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level of development (Kaufmann, 1997). These differences point to countries’ institutional 
frameworks as a contributing factor to the level of corruption (Kaufmann, 1997).   
Institutional theory focuses on the influence of established institutions and offers a 
powerful lens for studying corruption and its impact (Li et al., 2008). According to institutional 
perspective, institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience (Scott, 
1987; Oliver, 1991). Money, a common language, and a unified legal system are all examples of 
institutions which influence behavior routinely and almost universally by providing individuals 
and organizations with scripts for actions in a given context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
According to institutional theorists, systematic practices are also institutions that create a 
commonly understood social framework for behavior (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). Widespread 
practices become institutionalized and impose constraints on social behavior (Scott, 2001). In the 
context of many transition economies, corruption is institutionalized and represents an 
established institutional factor (Sajo, 2003; Teorell, 2007). Corrupt exchanges tend to be well-
established and formalized (Jain, 2001) and thus influence the business environment.2 Corruption 
and tax compliance specific to organizations are discussed next. 
Corruption and Organizational Tax Compliance 
In an overview of the literature investigating antecedents of organizational corruption, 
Ashforth and Annand (2003) noted that engagement in corruption is mostly driven by various 
environmental (e.g., strong competition, lax legal and regulatory enforcement) and 
organizational factors (e.g., poor performance, structural complexity). Corruption-driven 
unofficial payments can be offered proactively by the firm as a bribe or extorted by the civil 
                                                 
2
 Institutionalization of corruption does not imply that the majority of citizens accept this behavior as ethical or 
appropriate; instead, institutionalized corruption is often systematic and extensive due to power differences. We 
thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this issue. 
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servants3 (Transparency International, 2009). Bribery is defined as “a practice of buying favors 
from the bureaucrats responsible for formulating and administering the government’s economic 
policies” (Leff, 1964, p. 8; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). At the organizational level, bribes are 
used by firms to gain control over bureaucracy and influence decision-making (Melé, 2009; 
Transparency International, 2009). Studies examining factors that contribute to bribery found 
that firms were more likely to bribe if their competitors were using such practices (Li and 
Ouyang, 2007; Collins et al., 2009; Venard, 2009). The level of bribery by firms in turn has vast 
societal consequences, including influence on tax compliance rates (Leff, 1964).  
However, extortion of unofficial payments by government officials may be a “more 
serious systematic corruption problem than bribery” (Nielsen and Ballas, 2000, p. 76; Nielsen, 
2003). Extortion occurs when “someone (the extortionist) demands money, or some other gift to 
which he or she is not entitled, through intimidation or undue exercise of authority (Melé, 2009, 
p. 141). Institutionalized extortion occurs when payments are made “in order to obtain essential 
services from government where government is the key or sole provider of these services” (Sajo, 
2003, p. 189). As it relates to taxation, Nielsen and Ballas (2000) describe a number of scenarios 
when businesses are asked to make unofficial payments in order to continue operating, to elude 
fines, and to avoid an increased tax bill. Further, extortion can be disguised as bribery when 
firms have to make payments to avoid bureaucratic delays (Doh et al., 2003) or comply with 
laws which were created with the purpose of creating bribery opportunities for the corrupt 
officials (Neilsen, 2003). In summary, while the degree of coercion varies, unofficial payments 
made for bribes and due to extortion undermine the functioning of public institutions (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003; Transparency International, 2009). 
                                                 
3
 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point. 
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Two perspectives, economic and institutional, each explain why higher levels of 
unofficial payments can reduce tax compliance rates. From an economic perspective, these 
payments have been described as a tax on economic activity (Leff, 1964). Thus, these payments 
occur in place of tax payments and divert funds from the treasury (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Robertson and Watson, 2004). From an institutional perspective, when unofficial payments 
become so widespread that it is an institutionalized practice, lower tax compliance rates may be 
more likely. While tax compliance in transition economies has not been widely examined, two 
recent studies of transition economies suggest that increased corruption-related unofficial 
payments by firms to tax officials decrease the level of organizational tax compliance (Joulfaian, 
2009; Uslaner, 2010). Thus, consistent with both the economic and institutional perspectives, we 
expect to observe a similar relationship between extortion and/or bribery-related unofficial 
payments and organizational tax compliance.  
H1: Corruption (in the form of unofficial payments) is expected to have a negative impact 
on organizational tax compliance in transition economies. 
Social Trust and Tax Compliance 
Andreoni et al. (1998) observed that social factors play an important role in tax 
compliance decisions. As noted in a review of literature by Hosmer (1995), theorists from 
various disciplines have recognized trust as a critically important social factor due to its 
significant impact on individual behavior, relationships, and economic exchanges (e.g., Hosmer 
1995; Uslaner 1999, 2002). Lewis and Weigert (1985, p. 968) defined trust as a collective 
attribute that is driven by the relationships of people within a social system and is based on a 
cognitive process which allows differentiating persons and institutions that are trustworthy from 
the ones that are not. Zucker (1986, p. 56) noted that trust is "vital for the maintenance of 
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cooperation in society and necessary as grounds for even the most routine, everyday 
interactions".  
Granovetter (1985) further argued that trust serves as the basis of social relationships 
which drive economic behavior. Specifically relevant to this study is tax compliance behavior. A 
number of prior studies have tested the link between trust and tax compliance. These studies 
mainly examined the impact of trust in strangers and authorities on individual tax compliance 
(e.g., Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Torgler, 2003a, 2003b; Murphy, 2004). This type of trust is 
typically referred to as generalized trust. However, the impact of particularized trust (reliance on 
friends and family) that is commonly associated with transition economies has not been 
examined. The different types of trust and their impact on tax compliance in transition 
economies are discussed next.  
Generalized Trust and Tax Compliance 
Generalized trust is described as a trust in strangers (Li, 2009; Dincer and Uslaner, 2010) 
and reflects the “belief that others will not act contrary to our interests” (Uslaner, 1999, p. 34). 
Trust among strangers not only lowers transaction costs but also leads to faster economic growth 
due to increased willingness to engage in trade (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; 
Uslaner, 2002). According to Li (2009), societies with high levels of generalized trust tend to 
have rules-based governance systems which are associated with fair laws, accountability, and 
transparency. In such an environment, people “have confidence that others will abide by the rule 
of law and cooperate in maintaining it” (Li, 2009, p. 22). 
Higher levels of generalized trust in a society are associated with higher individual tax 
compliance. Based on the data collected from a national survey of 299 taxpayers in the U.S., 
Scholz and Lubell (1998) showed that taxpayers’ trust in government and trust in other citizens 
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significantly influenced their levels of tax compliance. Trust in a society’s institutions also 
influences tax compliance. Uslaner and Badescu (2005) argued that trust in political institutions 
leads to greater compliance with the law, including paying taxes. Murphy (2004) used survey 
data collected from 2,292 Australian taxpayers and found a similar relationship. Torgler (2003a, 
2003b) found that trust in legal systems and public officials positively impacted individual tax 
compliance and the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes in transition economies.  
In summary, generalized trust has been found by previous researchers to have a positive 
relationship with individual tax compliance. However, the relationship between generalized trust 
and the tax compliance of organizations in transition economies has not been empirically tested. 
Prior studies noted that building quality institutions that can ensure the protection of property 
rights, and that the enforceability of contracts can be an important determinant for the emergence 
and sustainability of generalized trust (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Raiser, 1999; Zak and 
Knack, 2001). In the last two decades, transition economies have been implementing significant 
reforms to ensure better functioning of legal and political institutions (Raiser, 1999). These 
changes are expected to contribute to higher levels of generalized trust and a positive relationship 
with tax compliance. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis that reflects the expected 
relationship between generalized trust and tax compliance. 
H2a: A higher degree of generalized trust is expected to be associated with higher 
organizational tax compliance in transition economies. 
 
Particularized Trust and Tax Compliance 
Scholars of trust (e.g., Uslaner, 2002; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Li and Wu, 2010) 
distinguish between generalized trust and particularized trust. Particularized trust is defined as 
“the belief that trust can only be applied to specific individuals or individuals associated with a 
certain network or group, such as family members, relatives, and friends” (Li and Wu, 2010, p. 
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135). Higher levels of particularized trust indicate greater reliance on the informal networks of 
family and friends to make economic exchanges possible (Li, 2009). Such a system is described 
as relation-based governance. This type of governance is characteristic of the environment 
where people and firms lack faith in the legal infrastructure and strangers, but instead rely on 
who they know (Li, 2009).  
Countries going through the transition from a communist regime to the market economy 
are affected by the conventions (e.g., norms, conventions, rules of behavior) established during 
the Soviet era (Gerxhani, 2004). Under communism, individuals frequently utilized their strong 
family and friendship-based connections to access goods and services (Van Ees and Bachmann, 
2006, p. 14). These informal institutions continue to influence behavior and incentives in 
transition (Nelson et al., 1997). For example, Russia’s blat networks that pre-date Soviet era and 
relate to the use of extra-market, personal networks and contacts, in circumvention of formal 
procedures, to obtain goods and services (Ledeneva 1998; Michailova and Worm, 2003). 
Reportedly, blat connections in the post-Soviet era are utilized by individuals and organizations 
to get better jobs, to acquire financing at privileged terms, and to obtain access to high-level 
decision-makers who award business contracts and licenses (Ledeneva, 1998). While blat itself 
is uniquely Russian, similar networks of family and friends exist in other transition economies 
(Alon and Dwyer, 2012).  
In transition economies, firms’ business transactions and tax compliance behavior are 
influenced by established social conventions (Peng and Health, 1996). Countries with high levels 
of particularized trust tend to have networks and groups primarily concerned with their own 
interests (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, p. 45). This relation-based approach to business makes 
firms more focused on personal exchanges and not broader social infrastructure (Van Ees and 
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Bachmann, 2006). In such an environment, there is little faith that others will comply with laws 
and pay taxes (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Thus, a higher level of particularized trust is 
expected to be negatively related to tax compliance.  
H2b: A higher degree of particularized trust is expected to be associated with lower 
organizational tax compliance in transition economies. 
 
Corruption and Trust: Impact on Tax Compliance 
According to North (1990), in order to prevent a breakdown of economic transactions, 
social norms can fill the void associated with the failure of laws and regulations. Next we 
examine whether trust moderates the relationship between corruption and tax compliance. The 
relationship between corruption and trust is somewhat paradoxical. While corruption is 
recognized to be damaging for economic development (Ampratwum, 2008; de la Croix and 
Delavallade, 2009) and government efficiency (Ahmad and Brookins, 2007), higher levels of 
generalized trust moderate that relationship by allowing more firms to successfully participate in 
the bidding for licenses, permits, and contracts and making the process more competitive (Li and 
Wu, 2010). Unofficial payments have been found less damaging for economic development in 
countries with higher levels of public trust (i.e., generalized trust) (Li, 2009). For instance, an 
official accepting these payments has to evaluate whether the payee can be trusted, as unofficial 
payments associated with bribery and extortion are illegal in most countries. The paying firm 
also desires to avoid being caught or cheated in the transaction. Higher trust in members of 
society allows both parties of a transaction to have the comfort that payment and delivery of 
promised goods or services would occur 4(Li, 2009, Li and Wu, 2010). Given that prior evidence 
                                                 
4
 It is important to note that this relationship does not apply to circumstances when corruption becomes predatory, as 
“pure extortion that does not deliver value to either the briber or the society and hence, is detrimental to economic 
growth” (Li and Wu, 2010, p. 136). 
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suggests that the effect of corruption on economic development can vary based on the type of 
trust present in a society, higher levels of generalized trust are expected to decrease the negative 
impact of corruption on tax compliance.  
H3a: Generalized trust moderates the relationship between corruption and tax compliance 
in transition economies, such that as generalized trust increases, the negative relationship 
between corruption (in the form of unofficial payments) and tax compliance weakens. 
 
On the other hand, in an environment with high levels of particularized trust, unofficial 
payments enrich corrupt officials but impoverish the state (Li and Wu, 2010). As described by Li 
and Wu (2010, p. 137), particularized trust is more common in countries that have stronger social 
networks among family and friends and “a low level of public trust”. A high dependence on 
family and friends in doing business (particularized trust) is expected to strengthen the negative 
impact of corruption on public goods in general and tax compliance in particular.   
H3b: Particularized trust moderates the relationship between corruption and tax 
compliance in transition economies, such that as particularized trust increases, the 
negative relationship between corruption (in the form of unofficial payments) and tax 
compliance is strengthened. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data 
 The data for this study were collected as part of the 2005 Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a project conducted by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The overall objective of the survey was to 
obtain information on the environment for business development and private enterprise in 
transition economies of the former Soviet Bloc. Earlier administrations of this survey (e.g., the 
BEEPS 1999 survey) have been used in prior business ethics studies to address the antecedents 
of corruption in transition economies (e.g., Venard, 2009).  
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 The BEEPS 2005 survey was administered in March and April 2005 by using face-to-
face, locally-trained interviewers. At many enterprises, the face-to-face interview was conducted 
with the “person who normally represents the company for official purposes, that is who 
normally deals with banks or government agencies/institutions.” The survey itself contained over 
70 items focusing on the business environment of the firms, which had been refined through pilot 
testing. While smaller firms typically used only one respondent in the interview, larger 
institutions typically needed several respondents in order to address all of the specific topics of 
the interview. Interviewees were frequently assured that their responses would be completely 
anonymous and confidential.  
To assure accuracy of the answers, many of the questions asked participants to assess the 
actions of the “typical firm in your area of business” rather than assessing their own firm; this 
indirect questioning thus made it easier for respondents to provide information (see also Venard, 
2009). Interviews were also structured to elicit valid responses to sensitive questions, such as the 
frequency of unofficial payments to government officials. These questions were further prefaced 
with reassurances that inquires about the behavior of a “typical” firm in no way implied that the 
respondent’s company approved of or condoned such behavior, were intended only to be the 
respondent’s opinion in their personal capacity, and that any comments given could not be 
attributed to the individual respondent or his or her company. Interview responses were audited 
and clarified through call-back phone checks; a minimum of 30% of respondents received a call-
back check (100% in Russia and the Asian Republics). 
The BEEPS 2005 survey was designed to be representative of the population of each 
country in terms of ownership, size, geographic location, and industry sub-sector. The survey 
was administered to 9,655 enterprises in 27 transition countries. For the purposes of this study, 
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responses from enterprises in five countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Yugoslavia, with an aggregate of 2,028 responses) were eliminated because these countries 
were not included in the World Values Survey, which contained the data for one of the variables 
(described in a subsequent sub-section). Other enterprises were eliminated if they failed to 
respond to one of the measures used in the study (2,483 responses). The final data set for the 
study included the responses from 5,144 enterprises representing 22 transition countries. 
 Table 1 contains information regarding the number of responses from each of the 22 
countries included in the sample. Table 1 also includes information about the average reported 
rates of tax compliance from each of these countries, including the average sales, workforce, and 
wage bill reported for tax purposes, and a summed total of these tax compliance measures (tax 
compliance scale). Overall, the average compliance rate reported was between 85.6-88.9% for 
these three measures. Russia (tax compliance scale of 284, or an average of 94.7%) and Poland 
(tax compliance scale of 283, or an average of 94.3%) had the highest levels of average tax 
compliance, while Bosnia/Herzegovina (tax compliance scale of 208, or an average of 69.3%) 
and Azerbaijan (tax compliance scale of 221, or an average of 73.7%) had the lowest average 
levels.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Model  
 We employ the following model in examining the effect of corruption and trust on tax 
compliance:  
TAXCOMPLY = a
 
+
 
bX + dC + e
     
(1)
        
 
where TAXCOMPLY is a measure of tax compliance by firms in transition economies; X is a set 
of test variables pertaining to corrutption and trust; C is a set of control variables representing 
17 
 
other factors that could be related to tax compliance in transition economies; and e represents the 
traditional error term. We describe each of the variables and their measures in the subsequent 
sub-section.  
The data used to predict the influence of corruption and trust on tax compliance in 
transition economies originates from both firm-level and country-level (i.e., generalized trust) 
responses. This use of multi-level data signifies that ordinary-least squares regression is not an 
appropriate modeling technique because different types of error variation are present. Thus, a 
multi-level, mixed-effects, restricted maximum likelihood (REML) regression is used for 
estimating the model.5 We treat “country” as a random effect to control for the potential 
differences at the country-level of analysis.   
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the study is the level of tax compliance, or TAXCOMPLY. This 
variable is measured as the summed response to three questions in the BEEPS study: (1) 
“Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, 
what percentage of annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business 
reports for tax purposes?”, (2) “Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully 
complying with labor regulations, what percentage of total workforce would you estimate the 
typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes?”, and (3) “Recognizing the 
difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with labor regulation, what percentage of the 
actual wage bill would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax 
purposes?” Respondents answered each question indicating a percentage. Factor analysis of the 
                                                 
5
 Unlike maximum likelihood estimators, REML takes the number of parameters into account. Since the number of 
countries in the analysis (22) is fairly low, we use REML regression.  
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three questions indicated that the constructs all loaded on to one factor, indicating uni-
dimensionality; furthermore, the Cronbach’s alpha of the three items (0.891) indicated sufficient 
reliability. Thus, the three measures are summed to form an overall “tax compliance scale” 
measure for our primary analysis. In supplemental analyses, we conduct separate analyses for the 
three types of tax compliance decisions to further investigate the influence of our hypothesized 
variables on these different types of tax compliance.  
Independent Variables 
The 2005 BEEPS survey contains multiple questions that measure the extent to which 
firms made “unofficial” payments and gifts during the year (Venard, 2009). Specifically, 
respondents answered the question, “Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like 
yours would make in a given year, could you please tell me how often they make 
payments/gifts?” for a variety of purposes. Due to our study’s focus on tax compliance, our 
measure of CORRUPTION reflects unofficial payments that would be made in “dealing with 
taxes and tax collection.” This question was answered on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging 
from never (“1”) to always (“6”). While this measure does not distinguish between payments 
given as bribes to control and influence decision making or due to extortion by government 
officials, both types of unofficial payments are forms of corruption that undermine the 
functioning of public institutions.  
The measure for generalized trust, or trust in strangers, was not captured in the BEEPS 
survey. Instead, a country-level measure from the World Values Survey was utilized. The World 
Values Survey contains data from thousands of randomly selected individuals in 57 societies on 
a range of attitudes and values (La Porta et al. 1997). This study’s analysis uses the 2005 version 
of the questionnaire. One of the questions was: "Generally speaking, would you say that most 
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people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Following Knack 
and Keefer (1996) and La Porta et al. (1997), the proportion of individuals answering “most 
people can be trusted” (as opposed to whether people “need to be very careful”) is our measure 
of generalized trust, or GEN-TRUST. According to Knack and Keefer (1996, p. 1256), while the 
term ‘people’ in the question is fairly ambiguous, it is “general enough that responses should not 
merely reflect expectations about the behavior of friends and family.” This measure is also 
consistent with other conceptualizations of generalized trust as the extent to which people 
“believe that most people share common values and are willing to trust strangers who may 
outwardly seem quite different from themselves” (Uslander and Conley, 2003, p. 335). Thus, 
higher degrees of generalized trust are associated with higher levels of trust in the broader 
community and willingness “to trust strangers who may outwardly seem quite different from 
themselves” (Uslander and Conley, 2003, p. 335). 
The measure of particularized trust, or the degree of reliance on family or friends, 
originates from the BEEPS survey. According to Li (2009), particularized trust manifests itself 
through trust in a relationship and is apparent in trusting family members and friends to 
safeguard and conduct business. Thus, our measure of particularized trust is the response to the 
question, “How important are [family and friends] as potential sources of information about new 
customers for your firm?” Responses for the variable PART-TRUST ranged on a 1-5 Likert-type 
scale, with 1 = “slightly important” and 5 = “extremely important.” This measure is consistent 
with the Uslaner and Conley’s (2003, p. 335) conceptualization of particularized trust as the 
degree to which people “do have faith in other people but only in other people from their own 
group” and who base their relationships on “family, close friends, and member of their own 
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groups,” with the measure capturing the degree to which respondents rely on friends and family 
members.  
Control Variables 
 We include additional variables from the BEEPS survey that have been shown in prior 
research to influence tax compliance. Uslaner (2010) identifies the quality of governmental 
services as an important influence on tax compliance. Following Uslaner (2010), the proxy for 
the quality of infrastructure services is the number of days of power outages or disruptions in the 
past 12 months, or SERVICE.6 We also follow Uslaner (2010) and include a control for the 
fairness of the legal system, LEGAL. While Uslaner (2010) used a one-item measure for this 
measure, we develop a multi-item scale that measures whether the court system is perceived as 
fair and impartial, honest, quick, affordable, and able to enforce its decisions. Each of these five 
measures is measured on a 6-point Likert-type scale; factor analysis identifies one dimension, 
and the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.849.   
 Another important control used by Uslaner (2010) is the size of the firm, as larger firms 
tend to have higher levels of tax compliance. Our measure of size, SIZE, originates from the 
BEEPS survey and is divided into three categories: small firms (less than 50 full-time 
employees), medium-size firms (more than 50 but less than 250 full-time employees) and large-
size firms (more than 250 but less than 10,000 full-time employees)7. Again following Uslaner 
(2010), we also consider the ownership structure of the firm, and include a control for the 
percentage of ownership by private, domestic individuals or organizations, OWNER.  
 Finally, we include two additional variables to control for their potential influence on tax 
compliance. First, given that the tax management behavior of firms may be influenced by 
                                                 
6
 We considered a multi-item measure that contains other measures of the infrastructure services, but as the measure 
does not demonstrate sufficient reliability, we follow Uslaner (2010) and use the one-item measure.  
7
 The BEEPS Questionnaire did not include firms with more than 10,000 full-time employees.  
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corporate governance attributes (e.g., Minnick and Noga, 2010), we include a measure for 
whether the firms’ financial statements are checked or certified by an external auditor, AUDIT. 
Second, we also control for the effectiveness of unofficial payments or “private gifts.” Uslaner 
(2010) demonstrated that the degree of influence the firm had on the government negatively 
affected the level of tax compliance; thus, we include EFFECT, a five-point Likert-type scale 
assessing the perceived effectiveness of the firm’s unofficial payments to affect the votes of 
legislators.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all variables included in the study’s 
analysis, including the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. Examination of 
summary information indicates that generalized trust is fairly low in transition economies (with 
only 23.3% perceiving that “most people” could be trusted); particularized trust is also fairly low 
(mean of 2.55 on a 5-point Likert-type scale assessing reliance on family and friends). Frequency 
of corruption as it relates to unofficial payments for tax purposes averaged at 1.95, based on a 6-
point scale.  
 Table 2, Panel B presents information about the average level of the study’s independent 
variables by country: the tax-related corruption scale, generalized trust, and particularized trust. 
Azerbaijan (3.01), the Slovak Republic (2.82), and Ukraine (2.82) had the highest average 
frequency of unofficial payments for tax purposes, whereas Croatia (1.26) had the lowest 
average levels. Ukraine (generalized trust of 0.3029) and Hungary (generalized trust of 0.3018) 
demonstrated the highest average levels of trust in strangers while FYR Macedonia had the 
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lowest average levels (generalized trust of 0.1111). Finally, trust in family and friends is highest 
in Latvia (particularized trust of 3.29) and lowest in Poland (particularized trust of 2.08).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Correlation Analysis 
 Table 3 presents a correlation matrix with all of the study’s variables. As shown in Table 
3, the highest correlation between any of the test variables and control variables is between 
CORRUPTION and EFFECT (correlation coefficient of 0.293); not surprisingly, higher levels of 
unofficial payments for tax purposes are associated with greater perceived effectiveness of the 
payments. The largest correlation in the matrix among any of the control variables is between 
SIZE and OWNER (correlation coefficient of -0.365), indicating that smaller firms tended to have 
higher levels of private domestic ownership. Overall, none of the correlations between any of the 
model variables indicate the potential presence of multicollinearity.  
 The correlations show that CORRUPTION is positively associated with PART-TRUST, 
SERVICE, and OWNER; the variable is negatively associated with LEGAL. Thus, firms with 
higher frequency of unofficial payments have higher levels of particularized trust (reliance on 
family and friends), suffer more power outages, have a higher level of private domestic 
ownership, and perceive the legal system as less fair. These factors indicate that tax-related 
unofficial payments are more common among firms with greater dependence on close friends 
and family members.  
 The dependent variable TAXCOMPLY is negatively associated with CORRUPTION and 
PART-TRUST, but is positively associated with GEN-TRUST. Tax compliance is therefore lower 
among firms with a higher frequency of tax-related unofficial payments and those that rely on 
family and friends, but is higher when trust in strangers is higher.  
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
Mixed Effect Regression Results  
 To investigate the role of tax-related unofficial payments and social trust on tax 
compliance in transition economies, two models are estimated. The first model (Model 1) is 
estimated by regressing firm tax compliance directly on CORRUPTION, GEN-TRUST, PART-
TRUST, and the set of control variables (i.e., only main effects and the control variables are 
estimated). The second model (Model 2) is estimated by adding the interaction terms between 
CORRUPTION and GEN-TRUST, and between CORRUPTION and PART-TRUST.8 Table 4 
reports the regression results for both models, including the parameter estimates and standard 
errors for each independent variable. All reported p-values are two-tailed, with the exception of 
directional hypothesized variables, which are one-tailed. Both models include random effects for 
the country grouping, and both models are statistically significant (both p < .0001).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Hypothesis 1 anticipated that corruption would be negatively related to organizational tax 
compliance in transition economies. As shown in Table 4, the coefficient for CORRUPTION is 
significant and negative in both model specifications (both p < .01). Thus, consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Joulfaian, 2009; Uslaner, 2010), Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted a complex relationship with the role of social trust on firm tax 
compliance. Specifically, Hypothesis 2a predicted that higher levels of generalized trust would 
be associated with higher levels of tax compliance, whereas Hypothesis 2b predicted that higher 
levels of particularized trust would be associated with lower degrees of tax compliance (Li, 
2009). The coefficient on GEN-TRUST is positive and statistically significant at p < .05 in the 
                                                 
8
 Interaction terms were not mean-centered, since research suggests that mean-centering of variables does not reduce 
multicollinearity (Echambadi and Hess, 2007).  
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first model specification (without the interaction term), showing that higher levels of generalized 
trust are associated with higher tax compliance levels. However, the coefficient is no longer 
statistically significant when the interaction terms between the trust variables and corruption are 
added in the second (full) model. Hypothesis 2a is therefore not supported in the full model. The 
coefficient on PART-TRUST is negative and is statistically significant (p < .01) across both 
model specifications. Firms with a higher reliance on friends and family members (particularized 
trust) have a lower level of tax compliance, in line with the prediction of Li (2009) that rules of 
law are weaker in relation-based governance systems. Thus, Hypothesis 2b is supported.  
 Next we investigated an interaction effect between the corruption and social trust. 
Hypothesis 3a examined whether generalized trust would moderate the relationship between 
corruption and tax compliance, whereas Hypothesis 3b examined whether particularized trust 
moderates that relationship. Inspection of Model 2 in Table 4 shows that there is a statistically 
significant positive interaction between corruption and generalized trust (p <.01); however, the 
interaction between corruption and particularized trust fails to reach statistical significance. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3a is supported (the interaction between corruption and generalized trust), 
whereas Hypothesis 3b is not supported (the interaction between corruption and particularized 
trust).  
 To further explore the implication of the positive coefficients on the interaction term 
between generalized trust and corruption in Table 4, we dichomized both variables at the scale 
median and graphed the interaction; see Figure 1. Figure 1 demonstrates that when corruption 
levels are low, then differences in generalized trust are not related to tax compliance levels – 
indeed, tax compliance levels are nearly identical in conditions of both high and low generalized 
trust. However, when corruption levels are high, then tax compliance is higher with higher levels 
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of generalized trust and is lower with lower levels of generalized trust. This interaction effect 
explains why a main effect for generalized trust on tax compliance was not found in the full 
model (Hypothesis 2a), and that the negative relationship between corruption and tax compliance 
is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust, therefore supporting Hypothesis 3a. Thus, it 
appears that whereas particularized trust is directly related to tax compliance (higher levels of 
particularized trust are associated with lower levels of tax compliance), generalized trust has an 
indirect relationship (generalized trust is not related to tax compliance when corruption levels are 
low, but higher generalized trust is linked to higher levels of tax compliance when corruption 
rates are high).    
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
Several of the model control variables had a statistically significant relationship with tax 
compliance; see Table 4. The coefficients on LEGAL and SIZE are both positive and statistically 
significant (both p < .01 across both model specifications). Thus, larger firms are more likely to 
comply with tax laws, as are firms that perceive the legal system as fairer (Uslaner, 2010). The 
coefficient on OWNER is negative and statistically significant (p < .01 in both model 
specifications), indicating that firms with a higher percentage of private, domestic ownership 
have lower levels of tax compliance. The coefficient on EFFECT is also negative and 
statistically significant (p < .01) in both model specifications, showing that firms whose 
unofficial payments were more effective had lower levels of tax compliance. However, the 
coefficients on SERVICE and AUDIT were not statistically significant in either specification, 
demonstrating that the quality of the service infrastructure and the presence of an external audit 
were not related to the levels of tax compliance.  
Supplemental Analyses 
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 Our primary analysis investigated the effects of bribery and trust on a measure of overall 
tax compliance. However, our measure of TAXCOMPLY was an aggregate of three different 
measures of tax compliance behavior: reported sales, workforce, and wages. Supplemental 
analyses conducts separate regressions on these three types of tax compliance to determine if any 
of the hypothesized variables or other factors have differential influences.   
 Table 5 presents separate regressions for each of the three separate tax compliance 
measures. Each of the findings for the primary analysis (with the overall tax compliance 
measure) continues to be statistically significant in these supplemental analyses. Specifically, 
corruption and particularized trust are associated with lower tax compliance levels, while the 
interaction between corruption and generalized trust continues. The only exception is that 
generalized trust has a positive, statistically significant relationship (p < .10) with tax compliance 
for the percentage of annual sales reported; thus, Hypothesis 2a appears to be supported for sales 
reporting behavior (but not for overall tax compliance). Overall, the study’s findings appear to be 
robust across different measures of tax compliance behavior.9    
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                 
9
 Several sensitivity tests further assessed the robustness of the study’s findings. First, it is possible that a reduction 
in the level of tax compliance could cause more corruption activities, such that the study’s model could suffer from 
reverse causality (endogeneity). We conduct a Hausman test to test for the possibility of endogeneity between 
corruption and tax compliance. The Hausman test does not demonstrate that endogeneity is present in the study’s 
model, indicating that the causal inference presented in the model between corruption (as an independent variable) 
and tax compliance (as a dependent variable) is reasonable. Second, our study’s dependent variables are implicitly 
treated as continuous variables in the regression models; we conduct a sensitivity test to determine if this assumption 
biases the results. As an alternative analysis, we use a Tobit model to account for the fact that some possible models 
are censored (e.g., those below 0 or above 300 with the aggregated dependent variable measure or above 100 with 
the separate tax compliance measures). Results are virtually identical; thus, the presented mixed-effect regression 
models do not appear to be biased. Third, additional analyses considered the effect of gross domestic product (GDP) 
or gross national income (GNI) on tax compliance; results are unchanged, and neither variable approaches statistical 
significance.   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This study examined the association between institutional factors and tax compliance in 
transition economies. Specifically, the study is the first to examine the impact of social trust on 
this behavior, and to distinguish between generalized trust (trust in strangers) and particularized 
trust (trust in family and friends) (Li, 2009). Based on a sample of executives from over 5,000 
firms in transition economies of the Soviet Bloc, the results confirm that tax compliance is lower 
among firms with higher levels of tax-related unofficial payments and higher levels of 
particularized trust. Interestingly, we also find that the negative relationship between corruption 
and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust. Thus, results suggest 
that dependence on family and friends is directly associated with significantly lower tax 
compliance. Conversely, trust in strangers (i.e., society at large) does not generally appear to be 
directly associated with firm tax compliance behavior, but has a significant indirect relationship 
through weakening the detrimental effects of corruption. These findings are robust for separate 
measures of tax compliance behavior: the total annual sales, workforce, and wages reported.  
The results of this study should also be interpreted in light of its limitations. First, the 
dataset is based on self-reported measures, which have been questioned by some researchers due 
to potential response and common method biases (Donaldson and Grant-Vallone, 2002; 
Podsakoff et al., 2003). Data from survey respondents also might be more valid in environments 
where there is high generalized trust among strangers, as such individuals from such cultures 
could be more likely to disclose sensitive information to an unknown interviewer. On the other 
hand, individuals in environments with a low degree of generalized trust may be less likely to 
disclose sensitive information to survey interviewers. Thus, the results should be interpreted with 
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this caveat. However, the use of the survey methodology is considered valuable for measuring 
perceptions and outcome variables in changing conditions (Griffin, 1991; Spector, 1994).  
 Second, the dataset resulted from in-person interviews with firm executives; smaller 
firms were typically represented by only one executive. While using data from only one 
respondent per firm could result in a biased impression of the firm, the use of such a technique is 
similar to other international corruption research (e.g., Venard, 2009). Third, while the model 
included an array of control variables that have been shown in past research as related to firm tax 
compliance of transition economies (e.g., the legal environment, service infrastructure, firm size, 
etc.), other control variables might also be related to tax compliance and could potentially alter 
the association between corruption and trust. However, we followed prior research in including 
the control variables that have shown to be influential in prior tax compliance studies on 
transition economies (e.g., Uslaner, 2010). Fourth, in this study we focused on the tax-related 
unofficial payments made by the firms, but could not differentiate whether these were given as 
bribes to gain control and influence decision making or extorted by the government officials. 
Both undermine the functioning of public institutions, however, and are both forms of 
corruption. Finally, most of the variables in the study were at the firm level, but the measure for 
generalized trust originated at the country level. This concern is assuaged by the fact that our 
model used a mixed-effects regression analysis that controlled for group (country) random 
effects. Future extensions could address these limitations. 
 The results of this study have important implications for the literature on international tax 
compliance. Understanding the antecedents of compliance in transition economies is particularly 
important due to the low compliance levels in these countries (Andreoni et al. 1998). This study 
answers the call of Andreoni et al. (1998) to investigate the relationship of cultural factors and 
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tax compliance, focusing on social trust. The study also contributes to the neglected field of 
study of corporate tax compliance (Torgler, 2008; Bayer and Cowell, 2009), showing that 
institutional factors such as corruption and trust are particularly important in explaining 
organizational behavior. The study also establishes the difficulty in increasing organizational tax 
compliance in relation-based environments that rely on close friends and family, suggesting that 
increasing generalized trust is important for improving tax compliance in transition economies. 
The different effects of generalized and particularized trust also imply that future researchers 
should be careful in distinguishing between these types of trust (Li, 2009). Finally, understanding 
the differences in institutional environments is essential to effectively working across 
institutional differences (Gelbuda et al. 2008), and the results of this study are useful in 
explaining the different vantage points of developed and developing nations.   
 Future researchers can build off this study and further investigate some of the significant 
findings. For example, the study showed that the effectiveness of unofficial payments is related 
to the level of firm tax compliance, as tax compliance was lower for firms who perceived their 
payments as more effective in affecting the votes of elected officials. Future research could 
examine other factors associated with this relationship. Differentiating between unofficial 
payments associated with bribes as compared to the extorted payments would shed light on 
whether different types of corruption have a unique impact on tax compliance. Similarly, the 
importance of generalized and particularized trust could be examined in non-transition 
economies. Furthermore, researchers could examine the effectiveness of potential preventive or 
educational measures being considered to address problems with tax compliance and corruption 
in transition economies. Another useful avenue would be the comparison of tax compliance in 
transition economies with developed countries to determine if similar relationships are present. 
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In all, this study demonstrates that decreasing tax-related corruption, increasing trust in strangers, 
and, interestingly, decreasing reliance on family and friends are all ways to increase tax 
compliance of firms in transition economies. Future research can build upon this work.  
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Table 1 
Description of the Sample 
 
Country Number of 
Respondents 
in Final 
Sample 
Tax Compliance 
Scale: Mean 
(S.D.) 
Average Sales 
Reported for 
Tax Purposes 
Average 
Workforce 
Reported for 
Tax Purposes 
Average Wage 
Bill Reported 
for Tax 
Purposes 
Albania 144 228 (80) 76.3% 77.7% 74.2% 
Armenia 171 254 (66) 86.6% 84.5% 83.6% 
Azerbaijan 152 221 (61) 74.9% 72.8% 72.9% 
Belarus 186 272 (44) 92.3% 91.9% 68.6% 
Bosnia/ 
Herzegovina 
74 208 (63) 66.8% 72.1% 68.6% 
Bulgaria 134 266 (61) 88.7% 89.7% 87.3% 
Croatia 191 276 (37) 92.5% 92.0% 91.5% 
Czech 
Republic 
902 267 (46) 89.8% 89.5% 87.3% 
Estonia 392 266 (57) 89.3% 90.6% 85.5% 
FYR 
Macedonia 
360 268 (45) 88.3% 91.2% 87.7% 
Georgia 295 264 (54) 86.9% 88.6% 88.3% 
Hungary 93 283 (40) 94.7% 93.8% 94.5% 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
231 269 (49) 87.1% 94.1% 87.4% 
Latvia 218 268 (49) 87.9% 91.0% 89.4% 
Lithuania 124 276 (41) 93.5% 94.0% 88.6% 
Moldova 112 272 (48) 89.9% 93.2% 88.6% 
Poland 95 276 (45) 95.5% 90.8% 89.4% 
Romania 91 265 (59) 89.1% 89.4% 86.3% 
Russia 297 284 (31) 94.9% 95.1% 94.4% 
Serbia 382 280 (41) 92.5% 95.1% 92.7% 
Slovak 
Republic 
309 255 (61) 85.8% 85.2% 83.7% 
Ukraine 191 277 (43) 91.0% 94.3% 92.3% 
Average by 
Country 
22 countries 254 87.9% 88.9% 85.6% 
Note: “Tax Compliance Scale” is measured as the sum of the average sales reported for tax purposes, the average 
workforce reported for tax purposes, and the average wage bill reported for tax purposes.  
All data is taken from the 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (2005 BEEPS).  
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Table 2, Panel A 
Overall Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
TAXCOMPLY 265.891 52.284 40 300 
CORRUPTION 1.952 1.327 1 6 
GEN-TRUST 0.233 0.054 .111 .303 
PART-TRUST 2.549 1.368 1 5 
SERVICE 10.963 45.696 0 365 
LEGAL 13.952 5.579 1 30 
SIZE 1.389 0.655 1 3 
OWNER 81.983 36.459 0 100 
AUDIT 0.460 0.498 0 1 
EFFECT 0.369 0.797 0 4 
Variable Definitions: 
TAXCOMPLY is the sum of responses to three questions (each up to 100) measuring tax compliance; higher 
numbers indicate greater compliance.  
CORRUPTION assesses unofficial gifts or payments to deal with taxes and tax collection (on a 6-point Likert-type 
scale); higher numbers indicate greater levels of corruption.  
GEN-TRUST is a country-level of the percentage of people who believe that most people can be trusted; higher 
proportions indicate greater generalized trust and trust in strangers.  
PART-TRUST is a 5-point Likert-type scale assessing the degree of reliance on family and friends in business; 
higher levels indicate greater reliance on family and friends.  
SERVICE is the number of days of power outages or disruptions in the past 12 months.  
LEGAL is the sum of five statements (each on a 6-point Likert-type scale) assessing the perceived fairness of the 
legal system, with higher values indicating higher perceived fairness of the legal system.  
SIZE assesses whether the firms are small (coded as 1, with less than 50 employees), medium sized (coded as 2, with 
50-249 employees), or large (250-9,999 employees).  
OWNER is the percentage of ownership by private, domestic individuals or organizations.  
AUDIT is a measure of corporate governance, taking a value of “1” if the firms’ financial statements have been 
certified by an external auditor and “0” if they have not.  
EFFECT is a five-point Likert-type scale assessing the perceived effectiveness of the firm’s unofficial payments to 
affect the votes of legislators; higher values indicated greater perceived effectiveness.  
Descriptive statistics are based on 5,144 observations.  
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Table 2, Panel B 
Descriptive Statistics by Country of Independent Variables  
 
Country Average Level of tax-
related 
CORRUPTION  
Average Level of 
GEN-TRUST 
Average Level of 
PART-TRUST 
Albania 1.79 0.2565 3.06 
Armenia 2.18 0.2468 2.95 
Azerbaijan 3.01 0.2053 3.12 
Belarus 1.38 0.2454 2.20 
Bosnia/ 
Herzegovina 
2.51 0.2193 2.62 
Bulgaria 2.37 0.2530 3.14 
Croatia 1.26 0.2509 2.27 
Czech Republic 1.55 0.2930 2.52 
Estonia 2.02 0.2152 2.29 
FYR 
Macedonia 
1.51 0.1111 2.29 
Georgia 1.76 0.1847 2.62 
Hungary 1.62 0.3018 2.32 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
1.78 0.1667 2.45 
Latvia 1.90 0.2474 3.29 
Lithuania 1.46 0.2192 2.23 
Moldova 1.55 0.1823 2.21 
Poland 1.25 0.2331 2.08 
Romania 1.51 0.1964 2.73 
Russia 2.73 0.2918 2.95 
Serbia 2.24 0.2580 2.41 
Slovak 
Republic 
2.82 0.1683 2.49 
Ukraine 2.82 0.3029 2.26 
Average by 
Country 
1.95 0.230 2.57 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix  
 
Variable TAXCOM
PLY 
CORRUP
TION 
GEN-
TRUST 
PART-
TRUST 
SERVICE LEGAL SIZE OWNER AUDIT EFFECT 
TAXCOMPLY 1.0          
CORRUP 
TION 
-.236*** 1.0         
GEN-TRUST .081*** .025 1.0        
PART-TRUST -.116*** .112*** .045*** 1.0       
SERVICE -.120*** .154*** -.056*** .056*** 1.0      
LEGAL .104*** -.053*** -.005 -.028** -.017 1.0     
SIZE .129*** -.047*** -.004 -.226*** -.030** .126*** 1.0    
OWNER -.125*** .058*** .046*** .213*** .034** -.077*** -.365*** 1.0   
AUDIT .028** .037** -.196*** -.170*** .089*** .104*** .320*** -.212*** 1.0  
EFFECT -.178*** .293*** .059*** .108*** .079*** -.058*** .006 .024 -.019 1.0 
*, p < .10; **, p < .05; ***, p < .01 (all presented p-values are two-tailed) 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
Correlation matrix is based on 5,144 observations.  
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Table 4 
Mixed Effect Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Tax Compliance  
 
 Model 1 (Main 
Effects) 
Model 2 (with 
Interaction Effects) 
Variable  Parameter 
Estimates 
Parameter Estimates 
Test Variables   
CORRUPTION (H1) -8.182 (0.62)*** -16.437 (2.84)*** 
GEN-TRUST (H2a) 126.259 (72.99)** 60.182 (74.05) 
PART-TRUST (H2b) -1.582 (0.57)*** -1.877 (0.98)** 
GEN-TRUST x CORRUPTION (H3a)  34.138 (11.29)*** 
PART-TRUST x CORRUPTION (H3b)  0.126 (0.42) 
 
  
Control Variables   
SERVICE -0.020 (0.02) -0.019 (0.02) 
LEGAL 0.562 (0.13)*** 0.578 (0.13)*** 
SIZE 5.280 (1.25)*** 5.326 (1.25)*** 
OWNER -0.111 (0.02)*** -0.112 (0.02)*** 
AUDIT -0.511 (1.65) -0.404 (1.65) 
EFFECT -5.929 (0.98)*** -6.266 (0.99)*** 
Constant 251.798 (17.59)*** 267.542 (17.88)*** 
   
Model   
Country (Group) Random Effects Included Included 
Wald χ2 447.28 457.96 
Prob. > χ2 < .0001 <.0001 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses denote the standard errors of the estimates; mixed-effect regression 
results use restricted maximum likelihood (REML). The mixed-effect regression model is based 
on 5,144 observations.  
 
*p < .10; ** p< .05; *** p<.01 (directional hypothesized variables are one-tailed p-values; 
remaining variables are two-tailed p-values)  
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
  
42 
 
Table 5  
Supplemental Analyses 
 
 Tax Compliance: 
Sales 
Tax Compliance: 
Workforce 
Tax Compliance: 
Wages 
Variable  Parameter Estimates Parameter Estimates Parameter Estimates 
Test Variables    
CORRUPTION (H1) -3.765 (1.05)*** -5.254 (1.02)*** -7.512 (1.11)*** 
GEN-TRUST (H2a) 36.744 (26.03)* 8.411 (25.44) 13.984 (25.02) 
PART-TRUST (H2b) -0.867 (0.36)*** -0.446 (0.35)* -0.576 (0.38)* 
GEN-TRUST x CORRUPTION 
(H3a) 
5.520 (4.18)* 12.02 (4.03)*** 16.979 (4.42)*** 
PART-TRUST x CORRUPTION 
(H3b) 
0.074 (0.15) -0.026 (0.15) 0.082 (0.16) 
 
   
Control Variables    
SERVICE -0.05 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) 
LEGAL 0.207 (0.05)*** 0.172 (0.05)*** 0.199 (0.05)*** 
SIZE 1.382 (0.46)*** 1.614 (0.45)*** 2.332 (0.49)*** 
OWNER -0.036 (0.01)*** -0.034 (0.01)*** -0.042 (0.02)*** 
AUDIT -0.363 (0.61) -0.151 (0.59) 0.136 (0.65) 
EFFECT -1.765 (0.37)*** -2.22 (0.35)*** -2.311 (0.39)*** 
Constant 85.666 (6.30)*** 92.59 (6.15)*** 89.579 (6.099)*** 
    
Model    
Country (Group) Random Effects Included Included Included 
Wald χ2 299.97 357.53 456.92 
Prob. > χ2 < .0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
*p < .10; ** p< .05; ***p< .01 (directional hypothesized variables are one-tailed p-values; remaining variables are two-tailed p-values)  
See Table 2 for variable definitions and Table 4 for model specifications.  
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Figure 1: Interaction of Corruption and Generalized Trust 
(for Overall Tax Compliance) 
 
